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Abstract
This paper studies the determinants of portfolio capital flows to emerging Europe along with the
spillover effects of U.S. monetary policy on the region’s portfolio investment inflows. Using a
sample of eleven emerging European countries over the period from 2000Q1 to 2018Q3, this
paper employs five fixed-effects regressions that include combinations of exogenous push and
domestic structural pull factors as explanatory variables for portfolio flows to emerging Europe.
My results suggest that U.S. monetary policy is only a secondary driver of portfolio equity flows
to the region and rather domestic factors including capital inflow restrictions, institutional
quality, and Eurozone membership are the most significant and consistent determinants. This
paper contributes to the existing literature by not only studying emerging Europe as a whole, but
also differentiating between Emerging and Frontier Market economies. I found that again
especially for Frontier Markets domestic variables were the main drivers of portfolio inflows, but
U.S. monetary policy and expected GDP growth differentials were also significant in driving
investments into European Emerging Market economies.
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1. Introduction
Ever since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, “hot” portfolio flows to Emerging Market
countries (EMs) have been a widely debated subject. When the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) cut
its policy interest rate to a record low range of 0 to 0.25% in December 2008 along with
introducing Quantitative Easing (QE), many EM leaders expressed their disapproval with United
States (U.S.). monetary policy measures.1 Then Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff, complained
to U.S. President Barack Obama that extremely loose U.S. monetary policy generated excess
speculative money that flooded into EMs, leading to “overvalued local currencies and
uncompetitive factories, thus impairing growth in emerging countries" (Lyons and Barkley,
2012). With western advanced economies’ (AEs) policy rates at or new the zero-lower bound,
investors allocated a larger share of investments to developing economies in a search for yield.
Figures 1 and 2 show the increase in speculative portfolio debt and equity inflows to emerging
Europe as a response to U.S. QE following the global financial crisis (GFC). Capital inflows
bring many benefits such as providing capital and growth, increasing productive capacity, and
lowering unemployment. However, they can also be inflationary, create asset bubbles, appreciate
the local currency, and wreak havoc in vulnerable developing countries if or when the flows
reverse (Pettinger, 2018). The volatility of portfolio flows to emerging Europe has increased
meaningfully since the onset of the GFC, and high and low episodes seem to correspond to U.S.
monetary policy announcements and actions (see Figures 1 and 2).
It is encouraging that the U.S. economy has been strong enough to withstand nine interest
rate hikes (arguably more if one counts the balance sheet runoff) since the Fed started to
normalize interest rates in 2015. However, the Fed and policymakers around the world should
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QE involved the buying of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and U.S. Treasury notes to increase liquidity and
further ease financial conditions in the U.S.
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also consider the secondary spillover effects U.S. monetary policies have on developing
countries. Global financial stability is in the best interest of U.S. firms, financial markets, and the
economy, and in an interconnected, globalized world, U.S. monetary policy decisions have
global implications that can have disruptive feedback effects on the U.S. economy itself. As a
result, the spillover effects of U.S. conventional and unconventional monetary policy on capital
flows and real economic impacts on EMs is widely discussed in economic research (e.g., Ahmed
and Zlate, 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Byrne and Fiess, 2015; Georgiadis, 2016; etc.); however,
emerging Europe is an understudied region compared to emerging Asia and Latin America (e.g.,
Grenville, 2014; Marfatia, 2016, etc.), especially with regards to portfolio flows. This paper adds
to the existing literature and aims to answer three questions: 1) Do emerging European
economies experience spillover effects from U.S. conventional and unconventional monetary
policies, 2) What are the main determinants of portfolio equity and debt inflows to emerging
Europe, and 3) Are there significant differences between portfolio equity and debt investments
by non-residents to EM and frontier market (FM) economies.
Emerging Europe is comprised of several smaller, middle-sized Eastern European countries
and much bigger Greece and Turkey. With an average annual GDP growth rate of 6.5% over the
five years leading up to the GFC, emerging Europe was one of the fastest growing regions in the
world (Eller et al., 2014). The region’s incredible growth phase was driven by outsized
international capital flows to the area as well as increasing trade integration with the EU. It also
drove credit growth, a rise in asset prices, and increased domestic demand. GDP growth financed
by credit expansion (largely denominated in foreign currencies) led to an increase in financial
vulnerability in the region that was exposed with the onset of the GFC (Eller et al., 2014).
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On top of that, the region’s strong ties to the European Union (EU) exposed the countries to
slow growth as well as the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. All of this led to a
substantial slowdown in capital inflows to emerging Europe as a whole, but with differences
between countries. While Poland and Turkey shared favorable management of the GFC, most
other countries entered deep recessions; it took most eastern European countries until the second
half of 2014 to surpass their pre-crisis GDP levels (Feldkircher, 2015). Poland was the only
country in the EU not to experience a recession in 2009. Since 2009 it has managed to grow its
GDP on average by 3.5% annually, posting an incredible growth rate of 5.1% in 2018 compared
to 1.9% for the Euro area. Over the two years following the GFC when investors were in a
“search for yield,” Poland and Turkey were two of the biggest recipients of foreign capital flows
in emerging Europe. These different fates for various emerging European countries and strong
economic ties with Western Europe and the world, highlight the importance of examining the
drivers of international capital flows to these countries. Recently, policy institutions such as the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) started to analyze growth
spillovers shocks to Eastern Europe. Using a VAR model, EBRD (2012) found that important
country-specific characteristics can explain stronger or weaker vulnerability to external shocks
for Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European (CESEE) countries. Another branch of research
focuses on the effect of European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy shocks on emerging
Europe; however, current literature on the drivers of portfolio flows to emerging Europe is sparse
with most research focusing on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows (Caccia and Pavlova,
2018). While emerging Asia and Latin America have garnered lots of academic attention with
regards to capital flows, emerging Europe is an understudied region (e.g., Grenville, 2014;
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Marfatia, 2016, etc.). Emerging Europe has become the main engine of growth in Europe, and as
such, it is imperative to investigate the drivers of portfolio flows to the area.
In order to investigate the determinants of portfolio debt and equity inflows to emerging
European economies, I use central bank policy rate differentials between emerging European
countries and the U.S. federal funds target rate as a measure of conventional monetary policy and
large-scale asset purchases by the Fed as a proxy for unconventional monetary policy. My panel
regressions control for both country and time fixed effects and includes a vector of external
variables (sovereign bond spread differentials, expected GDP growth differentials, and risk
aversion/VIX) and country-specific characteristics (capital inflow restrictions, institutional
quality, financial development, current account balance, inflation, and EU and Eurozone (EZ)
membership) to find additional drivers of portfolio investments to the region. The underlying
quarterly data on gross debt and equity portfolio inflows covers the period from 2000Q1 to
2018Q3 and includes eleven emerging European countries divided into five EMs and six FMs
(Table 1). I estimate five different specifications of my model including variations of external
and domestic variables all lagged by two quarters. Overall, the independent variables for
portfolio bond inflows come in statistically significant, have mostly the expected sign, and carry
economically significant magnitudes on the estimates. The results suggest that capital inflow
restrictions, institutional quality, and EU and EZ memberships are all significant drivers of
portfolio bond flows to emerging Europe. EU and EZ membership increase debt inflows as a
percentage of GDP by 4.21% to 5.76%. Similarly, a one unit increase in institutional quality
increases the debt-dependent variable by 10.99% to 14.08%. Results for portfolio equity inflows
are mostly insignificant; only central bank policy rate differentials, capital inflow restrictions,
and EZ membership are significant. As the policy rate of emerging European countries increases
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by 1% relative to the fed funds rate, equity investments as a percentage of GDP rise by 0.03%.
Additionally, a one unit increase in the capital inflow restrictions index decreases portfolio
equity inflows as a percentage of GDP by 1.29% to 2.07%.
In the second part of my analysis, I divide the sample into EMs and FMs. To my knowledge,
no other paper thus far differentiates between EMs and FMs, and even just taking a look at the
summary statistics (Tables 4 and 5) reveals significant disparities between the groups. On
average, EMs are more financially developed, have better institutions, and experience portfolio
equity and debt inflows twice as large as FMs (see Tables 4 and 5). The difference in country
characteristics is largely due to structural reason, while portfolio flow disparities are due to
investor dynamics. EM fund managers usually have investment restrictions such as minimum
market cap and risk tolerance and are typically legally only allowed to invest in EM securities.
Additionally, since the GFC EM index funds have risen in popularity accumulating trillions of
dollars in assets under management (AUM). The largest EM index fund has $29.3 billion in
AUM, and as of November 2017, the MSCI EM series has $1.6 trillion in AUM benchmarked to
it (MSCI, 2017). On the other hand, FM index funds are still scarce; the largest FM index fund
currently has a mere $512.5 million in AUM (Blackrock, 2019).
The sub-group results for portfolio debt inflows show that central bank policy rate
differentials, inflation, and EU and EZ membership are statistically significant for emerging
Europe’s EMs, while capital inflow restrictions, financial development, inflation, and EZ
membership are drivers for FMs. A one percentage point increase in central bank policy rate
differential increases EM portfolio debt investment as a percentage of GDP by 0.06%. On the
other hand, a one unit increase in financial development increases FM portfolio debt investment
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as a percentage of GDP by 17.49% to 23.13%. Similar to the full sample, EZ membership and
institutional quality are the most consistent determinants for both groups.
The story for portfolio equity inflows is somewhat different, as generally fewer results are
statistically significant. For EM portfolio equity flows central bank policy rate differentials is the
most consistent statistically significant variable along with expected GDP growth differentials,
capital inflow restrictions, and institutional quality. In contrast, LSAP, EU, and EZ membership
are the main determinants of portfolio equity inflows for FMs. In summary, while there are
significant U.S. monetary spillover effects to the full sample and EMs via central bank policy
rate differentials, domestic factors are the main drivers of portfolio flows to emerging Europe.
Further, this paper finds significant differences in the magnitude and the direction of
determinants for EMs and FMs, which suggest future researchers should be careful when
deciding on what countries to study, differentiating between EMs and FMs.
The results of this paper carry important policy implications for emerging European
policymakers. In recent history, EMs have usually come under pressure during episodes of large
capital flow outflows (e.g., 1997 Asian financial crisis and GFC). The increase in globalization
and global financial market integration in the last decade has made it significantly easier for
people to invest abroad and increased the magnitude and volatility of capital flows to EMs. As
such, it is vital for policymakers to understand what drives investment in and out of the country
in order to manage the magnitude and volatility of flows and prevent another crisis.
My results suggest that domestic variables such as capital inflow restrictions (financial
openness), institutional quality, and EZ membership are the most significant drivers of portfolio
flows to both EMs and FMs in emerging Europe. This implies that emerging European
governments should focus on domestic variables they actually can control and continue to
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strengthen them. I find that for FMs trade integration in the form of EZ membership significantly
increases both portfolio equity and debt inflows as a percentage of GDP. Governments are taking
notice of the benefits that come with the European monetary union. Half of FMs (Estonia,
Lithuania, and Slovenia) already joined the EZ and adopted the Euro as their primary currency
while Croatia and Romania are on the enlargement agenda and are expected to join in 2022 and
2025 (European Commission, 2019).
This paper contributes to the existing literature in four key ways. Most of the current
literature on capital flows (e.g., Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Byrne and Fiess; 2015, Hannan, 2017
etc.) set out to find what factors drive different types of capital flows to samples of AE and EM
or just EM countries, but to my knowledge no other paper thus far differentiates between EMs
and FMs to find the drivers of capital flows to each and compare and contrast the findings.
Similarly, Allegret and Sallenave (2015) and Eller et al. (2014) analyzed the determinants of
short-term interest rates and U.S. monetary policy shocks for samples of emerging European
countries, while Fratzscher (2012) examined the effect of a vector of common/global shocks and
domestic factors on net capital flows to AEs and EMs in different regions including Europe. This
paper seeks to expand current research on emerging Europe to include the drivers of gross
portfolio debt and equity inflows to EMs and FMs (excluding AEs) in the region. Also, several
papers (e.g., Keskinsoy, 2015; Chen et al., 2017) have studied the spillover effect of ECB
monetary policy on EMs in Europe and around the world, and I seek to expand on this research
by examining the spillover effects of U.S. monetary policy path on emerging Europe. Lastly, I
incorporate regional EM and EZ dummy variables into Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and Hannan’s
(2016) regression models.

7

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical background
on international capital flows; Section 3 reviews previous research on the spillover effects of
U.S. monetary policies and determinants of capital flows to EMs; Section 4 discusses the data
and data sources; Section 5 reviews earlier methodologies and lays out the empirical framework
of this paper; Section 6 reports the results for the full sample and EMs and FMs separately;
Section 7 discusses policy implications; and Section 8 concludes, providing paths for future
research and discussing study limitations.

2

Theoretical Background on International Capital Flows
The literature makes use of a wide variety of concepts and ideas, so before delving into the

determinants of international capital flows it is helpful to define the theoretical framework,
mechanisms, and components of capital flows.

2.1.1 Net vs. Gross Capital Flows
In its simplest terms, international capital flows are the financial side of international trade
between countries. A country that imports more goods and services than it exports is running a
current account (CA) deficit. As a result of this overconsumption, foreign countries will hold
financial claims against the deficit country which are recorded as a balance in the capital flow
account. In essence money/financial claims flow from the deficit country to the trading partner
while goods and services go the other way. Consequently, net capital flows offset the CA
balance (adjusted for net errors and omission, and changes in foreign exchange reserves),
meaning a current account deficit is typically financed through positive net capital flows. Net
capital flows and the current account balance give us a good idea about the trade in real goods
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and services, but they do not capture the much larger quantities of financial transactions of
today’s global financial system (Koepke, 2015).
Contrary to net capital flows, gross capital flows differentiate between foreign investment
into the host country and resident outward investment. Gross capital flows capture the exchange
of assets for other assets including international lending, borrowing, and financial intermediation
(Koepke, 2015). Both net and gross capital flows are important for comprehending the intricacies
of capital flows, but for the purpose of understanding the spillover effect of U.S. monetary policy
and drivers of capital flows to emerging Europe the theoretical benefits of gross international
capital flows are most appropriate.

2.1.2 Residency of Investor
Analyzing gross capital flows means differentiating between non-resident capital inflows
and resident capital outflows. Within the IMF Balance of Payments (BoP), capital inflows are
considered liabilities because they are claims against domestic assets while capital outflows are
claims on foreign assets and as such considered assets. I use gross capital inflows to emerging
Europe because non-resident flows are considered more volatile and foreign investors behavior
typically affect EMs economies the most (Koepke, 2015).

2.1.3 Capital flow components
The main components of capital flows are FDI, portfolio equity investment, portfolio
debt investment, and other investments/bank lending. Academic literature differentiates between
these components because they usually drastically vary in scale, scope, and volatility, and so do
the determinants that drive them.
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FDI involves an investment by an individual or a firm in the form of controlling
ownership and or a significant degree of influence over the decision-making process in a foreign
enterprise. FDI flows to emerging markets are less volatile, more persistent, and decline by
smaller amounts during extreme episodes because they usually involve ownership of illiquid
assets such as physical equipment and plants (Eichengreen et al., 2017). Due to this illiquidity
issue, FDI flows are less fickle and primarily driven by long-term domestic structural factors.
Hannan and Pagliari (2017) found that per capita income, trade openness, and capital account
openness are the most important drivers of FDI flow volatility. Especially for emerging market
economies, FDI flows are essential because they provide the largest source of external financing,
contributing 40% to 60% of aggregate capital flows since the 1990s (Institute of International
Finance, 2015).
Portfolio equity and debt flows make up all other cross-border transactions involving debt
or equity securities. They are investments in foreign bond or equity markets (bonds and stocks)
where the investor does not exhibit control or a significant degree of influence over the decisionmaking process of a firm. These transactions can be executed very quickly as investors can
adjust their portfolio holdings within seconds to economic or company-specific news, changes in
risk preference, and short-term fluctuations in financial markets. As a result, Eichengreen et al.
(2017) found that portfolio debt and equity flows are slightly more volatile than FDI flows.
Similarly, Hannan and Pagliari’s (2017) results indicated that along with per capita income and
real GDP growth, risk appetite (as measured by the VIX) and oil prices are significant
determinants of portfolio equity and debt flow volatility.
Lastly, “other investments,” often also referred to as bank lending, is a residual category
that includes cross-country bank claims such as bank lending, trade credits, and advances, special
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drawing rights, and currency and deposits. Eichengreen et al. (2017) found that bank lending
flows are the least persistent, most volatile, and drop most abruptly during extreme episodes.
Because the various components of capital flows react differently to external and internal
variables, I focus on portfolio debt and equity inflows to emerging Europe.

3

Literature Review
International capital flows play an essential role in the global economy and bring a host of

benefits and risks to recipient countries. They impact macroeconomic policy decisions and are
firmly in the center of a countries’ economic, financial and political conditions (Koepke, 2015).
Especially for EMs these capital flows can be rather large relative to their financial institutions
and have the potential to create significant domestic financial volatility. Hence, understanding
the main drivers of capital flows to EMs is an important policy issue, which is reflected in the
substantial academic interest the topic has received over time (Koepke, 2015).

3.1 Main Drivers
The role of capital inflows in EMs was first pioneered by Calvo et al. (1993) and following
their research Fernandez-Arias (1996) formally introduced the concept of “push and pull factors”
to distinguish different drivers of capital flows. “Push” factors are external in nature such as
global risk aversion and advanced markets’ (AM) monetary policy that push capital from AMs
into EMs. On the other hand, “pull” factors are country-specific domestic factors in recipient
countries including trade openness and institutional quality that attract foreign investors to buy
domestic financial assets.
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Byrne and Fiess (2015) analyzed the nature and determinants of aggregate (equity, bond, and
bank portfolio flows combined) and disaggregate capital inflows for up to 46 EMs. They used
quarterly equity, bond, and bank inflow data from 1993Q1 to 2009Q1 and examined the data
with a Panel Analysis of Nonstationary in Idiosyncratic and Common Components (PANIC)
model along with a panel regression. They went beyond the existing literature at the time by
considering not just global “push” but also domestic country-specific “pull” variables in their
study. The results indicate some commonalities in capital inflows, but they differ slightly based
on aggregate or disaggregate inflow data. Byrne and Fiess (2015) found commodity prices, U.S.
long-run interest rates, and most importantly global risk appetite to be important determinants for
equity inflows, while “pull” factors seem to be important for bond inflows. De jure financial
openness (as measured by the Chinn and Ito (2006) index) and the quality of institutions were
significant for bond flows to EMs.2,3 A fall in U.S. long-term interest rates and the resulting
lower return in bond yields causes investors to redirect capital to EMs in a “search for yield.”
Similarly, an increase in global risk appetite is associated with capital inflows for EMs. Byrne
and Fiess’ (2015) results indicate that both global “push” and domestic “pull” variables
determine capital flows to EMs. However, it is unclear how the authors chose the countries in
their sample, and due to a lack of data the countries are not consistent across samples/regression;
this leads to inconsistencies in the results and introduces a potential bias.
Fratzscher (2012) conducted a similar study to that of Byrne and Fiess (2015), in which he
analyzed the heterogeneity of AMs and EMs to global shocks (i.e., the GFC) and the relative
importance of common “push” factors and country-specific “pull” factors. He differentiated
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The Chinn-Ito-index measures a country's degree of capital account openness. It is “based on capital account
transactions, and the extent of capital controls and their data are based upon the IMF’s Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions” (Byrne and Fiess, 2015).
3
Quality of institutions is based upon the PRS group’s International Country Risk Guide.
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between gross equity and bond flows in analyzing a sample of 50 AMs and EMs. Fratzscher
(2012) focused on a more recent time period and compared the role of different drivers of global
capital flows during the GFC and the subsequent recovery. His results show that the main
determinants of capital flows during the GFC were global “push” factors such as liquidity and
risk (proxied by the VIX index); however, the signs of the model parameter changed during the
GFC compared to before.4 While an increase in risk before the GFC was associated with capital
flows out of AEs and into EMs, this effect reversed during the GFC inducing a substantial
reallocation of capital from many EMs into a few AEs (Fratzscher, 2012).
Additionally, the paper found that domestic “pull” factors have been vital in directing capital
flows in the 2009-10 recovery. In line with other research, Fratzscher (2012) found that the most
critical domestic factors are institutions, macroeconomic fundamentals, and domestic policies.
These are all variables that I include in my panel regression, but I apply them to emerging
Europe rather than a seemingly randomly selected sample of AMs and EMs.
Forbes and Warnock (2012) presented a framework for examining extreme episodes of
capital flows, which they grouped into four categories: surges (of non-resident inflows), stops (of
non-resident inflows), flight (of resident outward investment), and retrenchment (of resident
outward investment). They found that external factors, notably global risk aversion (as measured
by the VIX), drove most of the extreme phases economies experienced between 1980 and 2009.
This is in line with Fratzscher (2012), but both studies included AMs and EMs introducing
endogeneity, and they did not necessarily capture some of the fixed country effects such as
persistent growth potential and long-run interest rate differentials. Forbes and Warnock (2012)
further argued that rather than using net portfolio flows it is crucial to differentiate between
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The VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility index. It measures the level of risk, fear, or stress in the
market and is based upon S&P 500 options prices.
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capital in and outflows because foreign and domestic investors respond to shocks differently.
Usually, foreign and domestic investors tend to have different degrees of access to liquidity and
exchange rate exposure. As a result, their reactions can either counterbalance each other,
negating some of the volatility in net flows or magnify one another, increasing the volatility of
net flows
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) took a different approach to Forbes and Warnock (2012) by
focusing on a continuous timeframe rather than episodes of “surges” and “stops” as these
episodes are by definition not very common. As a result, it is questionable how much or even if
the results hold true in normal/non-extreme times, and how much of the “surge or stop” is a
consequence of oversized movements in the independent variable that also influence these flows
in normal times (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). Because my paper focuses on long-term trends and
drivers in equity and bond flows to EMs, I take the same approach and focus on a continuous
timeframe from 2000Q1 to 2018Q3 in my model. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) delved into the
determinants of net capital flows to EMs and investigated if there have been significant changes
in net capital flows since the GFC. The variables they considered within a panel regression
model were: GDP growth and monetary policy rate differentials between the U.S. and EMs,
global risk aversion (as measured by the VIX), number of capital control measures, and the 10year U.S. Treasury yield (from 2002Q1 to 2003Q1) and U.S. large-scale asset purchases (LSAP)
(from 2003Q1 to 2012Q2) as a measure of U.S. unconventional monetary policy. The basic
model included only the first three as external explanatory variables while additional
specifications (which I will go over in subsequent sections) added capital controls and
unconventional monetary policy measures. The results for the basic model show that growth and
interest rate differentials are significant drivers of net portfolio flows to EMs, but that especially
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global risk aversion plays an important role in explaining net portfolio flows. Additionally, when
we compare the pre to the post-GFC model the significance of growth differentials diminished
while the importance of interest rate differentials doubled, showing that since the GFC investor
and subsequent portfolio flows have been more sensitive to differentials in AM and EM interest
rates. However, once they included country and time fixed effects only global risk aversion
remained significant, supporting the idea that the fixed effects “may partly be capturing the longstanding growth potential and long-run interest rate differentials” between AMs and EMs
(Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). Ahmed and Zlate (2014) also highlighted that the pre-crisis model is
not ideal for predicting post-crisis net portfolio flows suggesting that there have been structural
changes since the GFC; additional variables such as unconventional U.S. monetary policy are
needed to explain the fundamental differences. Some drawbacks to Ahmed and Zlate (2014) are
that they used a concurrent instead of a lagged model which can skew results for slow moving
variables including LSAP that take time to materialize in financial flows data. Lastly, even after
discussing the importance of domestic factors the only country-specific variable they included is
capital controls.
Hannan (2017) attempted to fill this gap by specifically studying both the effect of countryspecific “pull” and global “push” factors on capital flows to EMs post-GFC. Similar to Forbes
and Warnock (2012) and different from Ahmed and Zlate (2014), he emphasized the importance
of distinguishing between net and gross flows and type of instrument (debt, equity, FDI, and
bank flows) since results can vary drastically across different specifications of capital flows.
Other than most research on international capital flows, Hannan (2017), similar to Ahmed and
Zlate (2014), used a fixed effects panel regression rather than a more complicated vector
autoregression (VAR) framework. The broad application of various versions of VAR models in
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the reviewed literature is because they capture the dynamic relationship between capital flows
and monetary policy. It also addresses endogeneity issues within multivariant time-series data
that a simple panel regression cannot capture and allows for multiple dynamic variables within
the model.
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and Hannan’s (2017) methodologies validate my decision to use a
panel regression. But unlike their papers, I incorporate lags to get some of the same dynamic
time-variant effects as the VAR model. Hannan (2017) included a number of variables vis-à-vis
the U.S. along with the more traditional “push” and “pull” factors (see Table 2 for a full set of
variables) and country fixed effects as explanatory variables. He investigated all types of capital
flows (i.e., net, gross, bond, equity, etc.) and normalized them with a country’s GDP. He
analyzed a sample of 34 EMs from 2009Q3 to 2015Q4 to capture the 2009/10 recovery in EM
capital flows. His results concluded that for portfolio debt inflows global risk aversion (as
measured by the VIX), GDP growth differentials and a host of domestic structural factors I will
expand on in Section 3.4 were statistically significant. On the contrary, for portfolio equity
inflows none of the push/pull or “push” variables were significant. Hannan (2017) acknowledged
that the results were influenced by the short timeframe considered along with the fact that some
of the indicators are slow moving and will not be “felt” until several quarters or years later.
When looking at high and low episodes of capital flows (defined as one standard deviation above
or below the mean), the results show that for debt flows risk aversion and growth differentials
were no longer significant but rather interest rate differentials, U.S. corporate spreads, and the
U.S. yield gap were essential drivers. On the other hand, for equity flows growth and interest rate
differentials along with U.S. corporate bond spreads determined inflows to EMs. Overall, risk
aversion and U.S. corporate spreads seem to have been the main determinants of capital inflows
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since the GFC but extending the timeframe of Hannan’s (2014) study and introducing lags
(Hannan and Pagliari, 2017; Forbes and Warnock, 2012) will contribute to the existing literature
in a meaningful way.
The abundance of variables, timeframes, countries, and models past literature has looked at
over the years can be overwhelming. In summary, the most critical global “push” factors
throughout the existing literature I identify and include in the panel regression are expected GDP
growth and interest rate differentials (long-run and short-run) vis-à-vis the U.S., and global risk
aversion (VIX). Additionally, I will contribute to the existing literature by focusing on gross
equity and bond inflows to emerging Europe, a widely under-researched geographical area with
regards to this topic, rather than a combination of AMs and EMs or a seemingly random highly
heterogeneous group of EMs, which seems to be customary for this area of research.

3.2 U.S. Conventional Monetary Policy
There exists a plethora of literature on the unintended spillover effects from U.S. monetary
policy on EM capital flows. Chen et al. (2014) study three main questions: 1) The impact of U.S.
monetary policy surprises on capital flows and asset prices in EMs; 2) Do the spillover effects
vary across conventional and unconventional U.S. monetary policy phases? 3) Are structural
domestic economic conditions a safeguard against spillovers. I will discuss their findings and
implications on the first question in this section and will come back to review their contributions
to questions two and three in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively.
Chen et al. (2014) carried out an event study using data from 21 EMs, selected based on EMs
international financial integrations and overall market liquidity, across three time periods:
Conventional monetary policy phase (CMP) from January 2000 to July 2007, unconventional
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monetary policy including the Fed’s LSAP from November 2008 to May 2013 (UMP-P), and the
unconventional monetary policy phase commencing with the tapering of QE from May 2013
until March 2014 (UMP-T). The event study used a 2-day window to measure the impact of a
monetary policy surprise on financial markets; it sought to identify short-term effects on capital
flows rather than capturing long-term persistence effects. Chen et al. (2014) also extended past
research by deploying a factor analysis to capture not just short-term but also long-term
variations in U.S. bond yields. They calculated two factors called market and signal factor, which
combined explain 99 percent of the variation in US bond yields (Chen et al., 2014). Chen et al.
(2014) defined the market factor as: “encompassing the portfolio rebalancing channel of
monetary policy, as well as any other information the Fed communicates about the supply of
bonds that will be available to private investors, and long-term risks to (or uncertainty about)
growth, inflation and changes to central bank preferences and objectives.” On the other hand, the
signaling factor loaded on the Fed’s future short-term policy path. The results showed that U.S.
monetary policy shocks do significantly affect capital inflows and asset prices in EMs, but the
spillover effects are only a recent development, having been small or insignificant before the
GFC. Also, signaling surprises regarding the Fed’s future policy path nearly always led to more
substantial spillovers than market surprises. However, because market surprises are less
predictable the Fed and other AM central banks need to watch the effect, they have on long-term
bond yields during the ongoing tapering process while also effectively communicating the future
policy path.
Rather than conducting an event study, Georgiadis (2016) utilized a GVAR model to
examine the long-term determinants of U.S. monetary policy output spillovers to the rest of the
world. He used a sample of 61 AMs and EMs from 1990Q1 to 2009Q4 and found that a 100
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basis point contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock had significant spillover effects on real
GDP growth in all sample countries.5 Interestingly, the spillover effects in most countries from
the sample were even more extensive than the domestic effects for the U.S. Of importance to my
research, his findings show that spillovers to Eastern European countries, Greece and Ireland
were particularly large. The rest of the paper delves into the importance of country
characteristics as determinants and resulting policy implications for EMs. In a general-to-specific
approach, Georgiadis (2016) determined that trade and financial integration, the manufacturing
share, institutional quality, financial system competition and depth, labor market rigidities, de
jure financial openness are statistically significant variables. However, I will focus on financial
integration, institutional quality, and financial openness (as measured by capital inflow
restrictions) for my empirical model. Given his findings on the large spillover effects of U.S.
monetary policy, Georgiadis (2016) raised the question of whether domestic monetary policy in
economies outside of the U.S. has been undermined by financial globalization. While countries
can to some degree shield themselves from spillover effects through trade integration, domestic
financial market development, increasing the flexibility of exchange rates, and reducing tensions
in labor markets he sees globalization as a big problem for the growth and development of EMs.
Koepke (2018) contributed to the literature by studying the effect of changes in Fed policy
rate expectations on international portfolio flow movements from 2010-13. His paper is different
from previous literature in that it used policy rate expectations rather than market-based yields on
U.S. Treasury bonds to proxy interest rates (Anaya et al., 2017) or U.S. monetary policy
variables, such as the federal funds target or effective rate (i.e., Ahmed and Zlate, 2013). Koepke
(2018) argued that if the Efficient Market Hypothesis is in fact correct, meaning markets are

5

One basis point is equal to one-hundredth of one percent or 0.01%.
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truly efficient, and asset prices fully reflect all available information including Fed policy path
expectations, capital flows to EMs should be predominantly driven by divergences between real
and expected interest rates (i.e., rates rise faster or slower than expected). In a process similar to
Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014), Fed policy rate expectations were calculated using federal funds
futures contracts. Additionally, the author is the only one thus far to have used both highfrequency EPFR fund flows, and international portfolio flows data as measured in the BoP. This
is important because researchers have found some contradicting results using the different
datasets. Koepke (2018) found that across both EPFR fund flows and BoP portfolio flow data
changes in Fed policy rate expectations are a significant determinant of portfolio flows to EMs,
especially for debt flows; a one percentage point shift in Fed interest rate expectations is
estimated to reduce EM portfolio flows by $15.3 billion. On top of that, the results show that
shifts toward tighter monetary policy were on average five times more impactful than shifts
toward policy easing. Also, the pace of asset purchases by the Fed did not play a statistically
significant role in determining portfolio flows. The findings of this paper suggest that more so
than anything else effective communication and “appropriate anchoring of market expectations”
by the Fed is of utmost importance for global financial order (Koepke, 2018).
Past research found U.S. monetary policy to have significant spillover effects on EM capital
flows and asset prices. Utilizing panel regressions similar to this paper, Ahmed and Zlate (2014)
and Hannan (2017) both found EM central bank policy rates relative to the Fed’s effective
federal funds rate to be significant drivers of portfolio flows, especially in the post-GFC period.
As such I include emerging European central bank policy rates vis-à-vis the effective federal
funds target rate as my U.S. conventional monetary policy variable.
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3.3 U.S. Unconventional Monetary Policy
When the Fed lowered the federal funds target rate to effectively zero on 17 December 2008,
it ran out of conventional monetary policy instruments to steer the U.S. economy out of the GFC.
To further stimulate the economy and encourage banks to lend, the Fed underwent three rounds
of QE, the buying of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and U.S. Treasury notes to increase
liquidity and further ease financial conditions. From 2008 until the first announcement by former
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke to end QE in May 2013 also referred to as the “Taper Tantrum” the
Fed’s balance sheet ballooned from $900 billion to over $4 trillion (FRED). QE had and
continues to have large financial market and capital flow implication especially for less
developed EMs; as a result, it has been a subject of interest for economic literature.
In addition to concluding that U.S. monetary policy shocks affect capital inflows and asset
prices in EMs, Chen et al. (2014) also studied the spillover variations across CMP and UMP.
They looked at a total of 125 U.S. monetary policy surprises, broken down into signal and
market factors, across three periods: 74 for CMP from January 2000 to July 2007, 42 for UMP-P
from November 2008 to May 2013, and 9 UMP-T from May 2013 until March 2014. The results
show that for the CMP phase neither signal nor market factors had significant spillover effects
exception for a signal surprise on equity flows. For both UMP phases, market and signal surprise
grew statistically significant for bond yields, exchange rate, and portfolio flows. Of notice is that
market surprises grew more significant over the three policy phases while signal surprises grew
larger for bond yields and equity flows but decreased for equity prices and exchange rates
relative to the UMP-P phase. This suggests that UMP mostly affected long-term bond yields and
exchange rates. Market and signal surprises grew statistically more significant in the three
samples, and signal surprises nearly always had larger spillover effects, but on average UMP-P
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shocks were larger than UMP-T shocks. In summary, the results Chen et al. (2014) present are in
line with most recent research in that they found unconventional monetary policies to have larger
spillovers per unit of surprise than conventional policies; however, the small sample size for
UMP U.S. monetary policy shocks suggests further research is needed.
Anaya et al. (2017) built upon Chen et al. (2014) by using the size of the Fed balance sheet to
classify unconventional monetary policy rather than monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, they
employed a global VAR model to capture the dynamic nature between financial and real
variables over time and between countries and include the role of economic characteristics of
countries as a determinant of capital flows.
Specifically, Anaya et al. (2017) studied the effect of U.S. unconventional monetary policy
shocks on portfolio equity and bond flows as well as financial conditions (asset prices and
exchange rates) in 39 AMs and EMs from 2008-14. On top of that, due to the substantial
heterogeneity in individual countries found by most existing research, I will discuss their
methodology and findings on structural domestic “pull” characteristics across emerging Latin
America, Asia, and Europe in Section 3.4. Beside the UMP shock in the form of Fed balance
sheet expansion (i.e., QE), Anaya et al. (2017) looked at a vector of endogenous variables that
include: EM GDP growth, short-term interest rates, exchange rates, global risk aversion (as
measured by VIX), and equity returns. The results indicate that U.S. unconventional monetary
policy does significantly impact portfolio flows to EMs for almost six months; however, in
absolute terms, the magnitude of the effect is minor (Anaya et al., 2017).
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) investigated the impact U.S. unconventional monetary policy has
had on net capital and portfolio flows using 10-year Treasury yields as well as LSAP to further
isolate more directly unconventional monetary policy actions. In line with the other papers
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reviewed in this section, their results showed a statistically significant negative impact for U.S.
Treasury yields, and a positive impact for LSAP on net portfolio flows to EMs. This means that
as the Fed expanded (tapered) the LSAP, net portfolio inflows to EMs increased (decreased).
Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014) expanded on the subject of tapering QE by studying the
effect of monetary policy normalization on portfolio flows to EMs using a GVAR model. They
described a “policy normalization shocks” as an increase in both U.S. long term yield spreads of
120 bps (in line with the 112 bps increase in yield spreads following former Fed chairman
Bernanke’s famous “Taper Tantrum” speech on 22 May 2013) and monetary policy expectations
(as measured by the federal funds futures rate) while keeping the federal funds rate unchanged.
The sample included weekly portfolio investment flow data from EPFR for 23 EMs from
January 2004 until January 2014. Results showed that a 120 bps increase in bond yield spreads
decreases capital flows as a percentage of GDP by 0.5% on impact, increasing to an accumulated
average of 1.2% and 1.7% over three and six months, respectively (Dahlhaus and Vasishtha,
2014). In absolute terms, the impact of these results might seem relatively small, but episodes
such as the one following the “Taper Tantrum” which saw a decrease in portfolio flows to EMs
by 1% of GDP can have a significant impact on financial volatility in EMs. In line with other
literature, Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014) also found that equity flows are more volatile while
bond flows are more sensitive to AM monetary policies.
Interestingly, there were significant variations in the effect of “policy normalization shocks”
on different countries in the sample. On impact, capital flows to Hungary and South Africa
decreased by 1.5%, while portfolio flows to Bulgaria and Venezuela remained largely unaffected
(-0.1% of GDP for both). Similarly, the twelve-month cumulative effect ranged from -5.83% of
GDP for Hungary to -0.41% of GDP for Bulgaria and Venezuela (Dahlhaus and Vasishtha,
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2014). Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014) hypothesized that domestic structural “pull” factors could
help explain the differences and shed more light on the interaction between EM capital inflows
and U.S. monetary policy spillovers.

3.4 Domestic Structural Factors
Domestic structural factors also defined in the literature as “pull” factors help explain some
of the heterogeneity found on this topic in recent academic research. This section relates the
findings on the effect of domestic “pull” factors on EM capital flows of papers discussed in
previous sections, before highlighting three papers that focus on emerging Europe.
After identifying significant cross-country variations, Chen et al. (2014) extended their
research to include domestic country characteristics. They controlled for macroeconomic and
financial characteristics and concluded that while neither feature is significant for the CMP
phase, strong macroeconomic fundamentals matter during both UMP phases. Higher real GDP
growth and current account surplus along with lower inflation and share of local debt held by
foreigners significantly dampened spillover effects to EMs; no such effect was found for the
financial variables market size and liquidity. Chen et al. (2014) were quick to point out the major
policy implications of their results for EM governments. The results show that there is at least
some shared responsibility for EMs in diminishing the spillover effects of U.S. monetary policy;
however, given the small sample size for the UMP-T phase (only nine observations), more
research is needed to draw any conclusions.
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) added two additional variables, capital control measures, and
foreign exchange (FX) intervention, in their model to get a more holistic view on the
determinants of net capital inflows to EMs. They defined capital control measures in two ways:
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1) “the cumulative number of measures in place in any given quarter” and 2) “the number of new
measures introduced in any given quarter” (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). The authors found that
even though capital control measures were not successful in preventing surges inflows postGFC, both capital control variables significantly reduced the spillover effects for total and net
portfolio inflows. Similarly, the cumulative FX interventions over the prior two years
significantly increased net total and portfolio inflows prior to and during the GFC but not in the
post-crisis model. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) offered explanations for the insignificance of FX
interventions in the post-crisis model including endogeneity issues and problems associated with
lagging FX intervention for two years by using GFC FX intervention to explain flows for the
post-crisis period. As a result, I do not include FX intervention in my model and instead focus on
capital inflow restrictions and other more robust macroeconomic and financial characteristics.
In addition to the variables mentioned above, Byrne and Fiess (2015) considered financial
openness (as measured by the Chin-Ito-index), human capital, quality of institutions, and
domestic economic growth.6 Their results suggest that de jure financial openness along with the
quality of institutions are highly important drivers of aggregate and disaggregate portfolio flows,
especially with regards to bond flows. On the other hand, Byrne and Fiess (2015) found no
evidence that domestic economic growth and human capital bear any significance in determining
capital flows.
Contrary to the last two papers, Forbes and Warnock (2012) found that domestic country
characteristics are poor determinants of capital flows during extreme episodes (defines as surges,
stops, flight, and retrenchment). The variables they include are capital controls, financial
openness, GDP per capita, and debt to GDP. They concluded that with the exception of debt to

6

Human capital is “measured by the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation data on the educational attainment
of the total population of 25-year olds and over” (Byrne and Fiess, 2015).
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GDP none of the other variables help explain waves in international capital flows. While Forbes
and Warnock (2012) presented findings against the importance of domestic “pull” factors, they
focused on extreme episodes of capital flows and included both AMs and EMs in their sample.
In contrast, I am studying a continuous timeframe to get a sense of the drivers of capital flows
during normal times, which are by definition more common, and only include EMs to avoid
endogeneity.
Fratzscher (2012) showed in his paper that “push” factors were the main driver of capital
flows during the GFC, but domestic “pull” factors have been particularly important since then
especially for EMs in Latin America and Asia. In line with Chen et al. (2014) and Byrne and
Fiess (2015), he found the quality of institutions and a current account surplus to be significant
determinants of capital flows to EMs.7 Additionally, Fratzscher (2012) splits the sample into
geographic sub-sections including emerging Asia, Europe, and Latin America. The results
highlight that domestic “pull” factors, while still significant, seem to be less critical in driving
capital flows to emerging Europe compared to emerging Asia and Latin America. Most likely,
this distinction is due to the proximity to and integration of emerging Europe with the EZ and the
associated European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policies; however, further research in the
form of this paper is required.
Diving deeper into the geographical area of interest for this paper, in a report by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bakker and Klingen (2012) found that the size of the current
account imbalance prior to the GFC followed by the exchange rate regime were most important
in accounting for diverse country-specific outcomes in emerging Europe. While this is not an
empirical paper, the authors did find strong evidence that countries with low external balances
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Quality of institutions is based upon the International Country Risk Guide’s financial and political institutions
criteria as well as the IMF’s sovereign rating of a particular country.
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(i.e., Poland) experienced stronger growth after the GFC than countries with large pre-crisis
current account deficits (i.e., Croatia, Romania, and Latvia).
Allegret and Sallenave (2015) expanded on this topic using a panel regression model; they
analyzed the determinants of short-term interest rates for a sample of nine emerging European
countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Serbia)
to understand why domestic monetary policy did not prevent capital inflows prior to and during
the GFC. While this does not directly pertain to my research on the determinants of capital flows
it provides insight into the important domestic variables that affect monetary policies in
emerging Europe. The results show that inflation (as measured by seasonally adjusted CPI) and
financial and trade integration in the form of EU membership are significant positive domestic
variables for determining monetary policy8.
Similarly, using a GVAR model Eller et al. (2014) found domestic GDP growth, inflation (as
measured by seasonally adjusted CPI), and European trade integration/EU membership to be
significant variables in explaining differences in post-GFC U.S. monetary policy shock effects
on Turkey and Poland’s real economy. The authors examined the impact of the Fed’s May 2013
tapering announcement on the economic performance of Turkey and Poland’s economic
development relative to before the shock. Because Chen et al. (2014) and Byrne and Fiess (2015)
found compelling evidence that domestic GDP growth is a driver of capital inflows to EMs, the
trade integration /EU membership variable used by Eller et al. (2014) will have second-degree
ripple effects in explaining portfolio inflows.
The above research speaks to the importance of microeconomic country-specific variables in
determining portfolio debt and equity flows to EMs. Similar to Fratzscher (2012) and Byrne and
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goods and services adjusted for predictable seasonal patterns.
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Fiess (2015) I include capital inflow restrictions (measures financial openness), institutional
quality, financial development, the current account balance, and inflation in my regression.
Additionally, based on the research by Allegret and Sallenave (2015) and Eller et al. (2014) I
include dummy variables for EU and EZ membership.
I fill a gap in the current literature on the drivers of capital flows by focusing on an
understudied region, emerging Europe, differentiating between EMs and FMs, and comparing
the importance of determinants for the two sub-regions, something that has not been done before.
Additionally, I include both concurrent and lagged U.S. monetary policy shocks as well as a
vector of concurrent and lagged exogenous and endogenous variables. This paper is not
representative of all EM and FM economies, but it aims to help policymakers in emerging
European countries better understand the spillover effects and U.S. monetary policy and main
drivers of portfolio inflows. Moreover, differentiating between more developed EMs and less
advanced FM economies gives policymakers in these countries further insight into the factors
that drive non-residents to invest in the region and how these drivers may or may not change
once a country moves up or down in MSCI classification.

4

Data
Using a balanced quarterly sample of eleven EM and FM economies over the period 2000Q1

to 2018Q3, this paper employs a panel regression framework to examine the determinants of
portfolio equity and debt inflows. I combine data from various sources (see Table 6) to come up
with my dataset; due to data availability issues for sovereign debt spread, capital restrictions,
institutions, and financial development, some results are limited to a smaller date range. In
particular, regressions including the last three variables mentioned above are limited to quarterly
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data from 2000Q1 to 2016Q4. I discuss my rationale for focusing on gross inflows and EMs and
FMs from Europe in the literature review above. As mentioned before, this paper contributes to
the existing literature by not only studying emerging Europe as a whole but also differentiating
between EM and FM economies within the region. As can be seen in Table 2, the countries
included are five EMs (Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Turkey) and six FMs
(Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Romania, and Slovenia). Estonia is excluded from all
regression result that include sovereign interest rate spreads because quarterly sovereign bond
spread data is not available.
To construct the dependent variable, I use quarterly portfolio equity and bond inflows data
from the IMF BoP series normalized by quarterly seasonally adjusted real GDP of the recipient
country retrieved from Bloomberg. I choose portfolio inflows because various instruments
behave differently, and I seek to capture the behavior of foreign equity and debt security
investors. Similar to quarterly GDP, I retrieve the data for risk aversion (as measured by the
VIX), sovereign bond spreads, and EU and EZ membership from Bloomberg. I take the average
value of the VIX for a given quarter as a proxy for risk aversion. Sovereign bond spread
differentials are in bps and measure the amount recipient country 10-year bond yields are above
the U.S. 10-year treasury yield. Due to data availability limitations, I do not have a complete data
sample for all FM economies and therefore use it in regressions selectively. EU and EZ
membership are dummy variables that take on 0 when the country is not a member of the EU or
EZ and 1 when the country is a member.
Contrary to sovereign bond spread data and in line with past research, central bank policy
rate differentials are measured in percentage, not bps. This data, along with CPI, was collected
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics dataset. I use total assets held by the Fed to
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capture the central bank’s unconventional monetary policy path following the GFC. This data
was used as a proxy for the Fed’s LSAP program and collected from the St. Louis Fed’s Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database. Data for the expected GDP growth was retrieved
from the IMF’s quarterly World Economic Outlook (WEO) reports. I use expected instead of
real GDP growth differentials to capture investor projections in allocating portfolio equity and
debt flows. Investors allocate capital based on projections not realized growth because in
agreement with the Efficient Market hypothesis whatever news happened is already priced into
the market. Data for capital restrictions, institutional quality, and financial development is only
available on an annual basis, so I implement the yearly values for all four quarters. Contrary to
most other research on this topic (e.g., Byrne and Fiess, 2015; Hannan and Pagliari, 2017), I do
not use the Chin-Ito index to measure financial openness because there is a lack of variability in
the estimate for seven out of the eleven emerging European countries. Instead, I adopt a dataset
on capital control measures created by economists Fernandez et al. (2015) in collaboration with
the IMF. They have compiled the most comprehensive dataset available on financial openness by
codifying the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions
(AREAER). They are also the only ones to distinguish between ten different asset classes, thirtytwo total transaction categories, and whether they are inflows or outflows. I use the Overall
inflow restrictions index, which is scaled from zero to one (zero being the best and one being the
worst) and averages total inflow restrictions across all ten asset classes and thirty-two transaction
categories. Because of the classification of financial openness with capital inflow restrictions
rather than de jure financial openness the expected sign for my results will be negative not
positive (e.g., Byrne and Fiess, 2015; Georgiadis, 2016; Hannan and Pagliari, 2017). I implement
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicator as a measure of institutional quality by equal
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weight averaging a country’s score across the six dimensions of governance (Voice and
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness,
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption). The World Bank makes use of
thirty individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, NGOs,
international organizations, and private sector firms in computing the individual scores which
can range from -2.5 to 2.5. Lastly, I collect the financial development data from an IMF paper by
Svirydzenka (2016). Before his paper, the primary indicators used by researchers to proxy
financial development were the ratio of private credit to GDP or stock market capitalization to
GDP. However, these proxies do not consider the complex multidimensional nature of financial
development (Svirydzenka, 2016). The index, which is scaled from zero to one takes into
account nine different dimensions and summarizes them in terms of a country’s financial
institution and market depth, access, and efficiency.

4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the complete sample, while Tables 4 and 5 break up the
two sub-samples into EM and FM economies, respectively. On average, quarterly portfolio debt
inflows were $591 million, more than four times as high as portfolio equity inflows which
averaged $139 million for the entire sample. Due to investor dynamics (see Introduction) and
size differences, portfolio flow disparities are even larger when comparing EMs and FMs. On
average, portfolio equity and bond inflows to EMs were twenty-four and more than five times
larger than those to FMs, respectively ($290 million vs. $12 million for equity inflows and $1.64
billion vs. $196 million for debt inflows). This disparity along with the relatively large standard
deviations for portfolio flows due to the wide variety and size of countries included in the sample
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makes a comparison between the sub-groups difficult. I effectively eliminate this problem by
normalizing the flows with a country’s quarterly real GDP. Policy rate and sovereign bond
differentials between emerging European countries and the U.S. average 4.64% and 2.45%
respectively are fairly similar for both EMs and FMs, and, as mentioned earlier, are slightly
skewed due to financial market crises in Turkey and Romania in 2001. Emerging European
countries were expected to grow GDP 0.26% more than the U.S., reaching a high of 4.75% for
Poland during the GFC. As expected, FM countries were expected to grow twice as fast as EMs
compared to the U.S. but experience a slightly more volatile GDP growth.
The VIX is a measure of the stock market's volatility expectations implied by option prices
and as such is highly volatile variable; I limit the volatility by using the log-transformed variable.
The Fed balance sheet averages $2.3 billion from 2000 to 2018Q3, ballooning from $580 million
at the start of the sample period to nearly $4.5 billion in late 2018. Capital restrictions,
institutional quality, and financial development average 0.28, 0.50, and 0.39 for the full sample
respectively, and remain bound in a tight range given they are scaled indexes. On average, EMs
have better institutions, are more financially developed, and have more open capital markets
compared to FMs. Interestingly, Estonia, a FM economy, has the highest institutional quality
across the entire sample countries and years. Estonia has had one of the highest institutional
quality scores in the sample since it joined the EZ. Lastly, over the sample period 60% or close
to seven of the countries were EU members and two countries were EZ members every year.
FMs have a slightly higher percentage of EZ members with the adoption of the Euro by Slovenia
in 2007, Estonia in 2011, and most recently Lithuania in 2015 compared to only a single EZ
member, Greece (2001), among EMs.
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5

Comparison with the earlier methodology
Following the GFC, much of the research on the drivers of capital flows to EMs, such as

Forbes and Warnock (2012) mentioned in the literature review above and Ghosh et al. (2014),
focused on identifying extreme episodes of surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment. The
assumption was that during these unusual times the drivers of capital flows would be
significantly different compared to normal times. This is a reasonable hypothesis, and Forbes and
Warnock (2012) found that contrary to most research on long-term determinants external factors,
specifically global risk aversion (as measured by the VIX), drove most of the extreme phases,
while domestic factors were not significant in explaining capital flows. The downside to this
approach is that it does not necessarily tell us anything about the determinants of capital flows
during normal times which are by definition much more common and hold for longer periods. As
a result, it is difficult to find long-term trends and to identify how drivers have changed over
certain periods (i.e., before, during, and after the GFC). The objective of this paper is to identify
long-term trends in the determinants of capital flows to emerging Europe and identify differences
and similarities between EMs and FMs. Therefore, I follow the more conventional approach of
investigating drivers of capital flows irrespective of the size of the flows.
Another recent development in the literature on this topic is the distinction between gross and
net capital flows. As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, contrary to net capital flows, gross capital flows
differentiate between foreign investment into the host country and resident outward investment.
This distinction used to be of little importance because EM resident capital outflows were
typically quite small up to the early 1990s (Koepke, 2015). However, since the early 2000s, EM
resident capital outflows increased to substantial volumes, meaning net capital flows were no
longer a good measure for non-residential flows (Koepke, 2015). Hannan (2017), Forbes and

33

Warnock (2012), and Fratzscher (2012) all found significant variations across net and gross
flows as well as the type of instrument. Hannan’s (2017) results show that while a “search for
yield” encourages resident’s choice to invest abroad, the growth differential between home and
recipient country matters for non-residents’ investment. Similarly, Forbes and Warnock (2012)
found that episodes of net inflow surges result in both surges of investment by non-residents and
retrenchment of resident capital outflows. I forgo this distinction by solely focusing on the
drivers of portfolio equity and debt investments of non-residents to recipient countries in Eastern
Europe.
Most of the research on the impact of monetary policy on capital flows uses a VAR model
because it can describe the complex and dynamic behavior of economic and financial time series
data and is extremely useful for forecasting. It captures the interdependencies among multiple
variables by modeling each variable on its own lagged values, past lags of other variables in the
model, and an error term. Following Hannan (2017) and Ahmed and Zlate (2014), I use a fixed
effects model rather than the VAR framework; however, I incorporate a two-quarter lag to
capture some similar effects to that of a VAR model. Additionally, I include specifications for a
concurrent model and one that only lags the monetary policy variables: central bank policy rate
differentials, sovereign interest rate spreads, and LSAP. I lag the monetary policy measures
because they affect the economy in numerous complex ways, and it takes time for these effects
to ripple through the real economy and thus have a significant impact on capital flows. While the
inside lag, the delay between the time a monetary policy change is needed and the time the Fed
actually implements it, is relatively short for monetary policy decisions the outside lag, the time
it takes for change in policy to affect the economy, can take a considerable period before a
significant portion of the full policy effect is felt and influence individual investment decisions.
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5.1 Methodology
I adopt a panel regression similar to that in Hannan (2017) and Ahmed and Zlate (2014). The
regression's dependent variable is an estimate of portfolio equity and debt inflows to emerging
European countries as a fraction of GDP (measured in hundred million). Similar to Ahmed and
Zlate (2014) and Hannan (2016) I introduce central bank policy rate and expected GDP
differentials vis-à-vis the U.S. along with the U.S. LSAP purchases estimated by the Federal
Reserve total assets as independent variables. Additionally, Byrne and Fiess (2015) and Chen et
al. (2014) found global risk aversion (as measured by the VIX index) to be an integral external
driver of capital flows to EM economies. Various authors (Fratzscher, 2012; Chen et al., 2014;
Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Eller et al., 2014; Allegret and Sallenave, 2015; and Byrne and Fiess,
2015) found evidence that domestic structural variables add a more holistic picture in
researching the determinants of capital flows. Byrne and Fiess (2015) showed that financial
openness/capital restrictions is a significant factor. As a result, I implement the most
comprehensive dataset on capital inflow restrictions from Fernandez et al. (2015) to measure the
financial openness. Byrnes and Fiess (2015) along with Fratzscher (2012) also discussed the
importance of high-quality institutions, thus I average the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators to get an indicator for the quality of institutions. In addition to capital inflow
restrictions and institutions, I include financial development from an IMF working paper by
Svirydzenka (2016), current account balance, CPI as a measure of inflation and dummy variables
for EU and EZ membership as domestic variables.
As mentioned in the previous section I use a fixed-effect regression model rather than the
more commonly used VAR framework. I include a two-quarter lag for all variables to capture
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similar effects to those of a VAR model. Lastly, I include fixed effects for both time and country
effects to capture differences between countries and over time.
I run five individual regressions for the full sample, EMs, and FMs respectively. The first
regression includes all external variables except for the sovereign debt spread data which I
incorporate into the second regression due to data range limitations. Similarly, I run two
regression for the full model with all domestic factors one including sovereign debt spreads and
one without the variable. Next, I only use significant variables from previous regressions to run a
fifth regression for all three-sample datasets. Lastly, I implement interaction terms to compare
the EM and FM regression results and see whether there are significant differences in capital
flow determinants for the two emerging European sub-samples.

5.2 Empirical Model
The core empirical models I use are fixed-effect panel regressions adapted and modified
from Hannan (2017) and Ahmed and Zlate (2014).
𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑈.𝑆.
𝑈.𝑆.
𝑈.𝑆.
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 (𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡−2
) + 𝛽2 (𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2
) + 𝛽3 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2
)
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−2 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−2

(1)

𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑈.𝑆.
𝑈.𝑆.
𝑈.𝑆.
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 (𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡−2
) + 𝛽2 (𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2
) + 𝛽3 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2
)
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−2 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡−2 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽8 𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2
+ 𝛽9 𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽10 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽11 𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽12 𝐸𝑍𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−2

(2)

Equation 1 analyzes the two quarter lagged effects of all external factors (including sovereign
bond spreads) while Equation 2 further introduces all the country characteristics variables in the
𝑃𝐼

baseline regression (corresponds to regression 4). The dependent variable, 𝑌 𝑖,𝑡, measures the
𝑖,𝑡
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equity and bond portfolio inflows for a country i over time t in millions of USD as a proportion
of GDP (Y) in hundred million of USD. In order to account for differences between debt and
equity portfolio inflows and variations in EM and FM economies, I run both equations for the
two types of instruments and economies (i.e., Equation 1 with specification: portfolio debt
inflows to EMs). This results in four different specifications for both equations.
The inflows as a percentage of GDP are modeled as a function of a vector of external and
domestic variables: 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡𝑈.𝑆. measures the central bank policy rate of an emerging
𝑈.𝑆.
European country minus the effective U.S. federal funds rate; 𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡
represents the

spread in bps in the yield of an emerging European 10-year sovereign bond and the 10-year U.S.
treasury; 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡𝑈.𝑆. measures the expected GDP growth rate differential between
emerging European countries and the U.S.; 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 measures the global investor risk appetite;
𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡 acts as a proxy for U.S. unconventional monetary policy and measures the total assets
held by the Fed; 𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 measures capital inflow restrictions and represents a countries financial
openness to capital inflows (the lower the better); 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 represents the quality of institutions for
a country; 𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 represents the financial development of a country; 𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 represents a country’s
current account position normalized by real GDP and aims to capture financial vulnerability;
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 measures inflation in a country; 𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country is a
member of the EU; 𝐸𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country is a member of the EZ
monetary union; 𝛿𝑖 captures time fixed effects; 𝜏𝑡 captures country fixed effects; and finally, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is
the stochastic error term which is added to introduce all other variation in equity/debt portfolio
inflows that cannot be explained by the model. I run all regressions with robust standard errors to
control for heteroskedasticity and obtain unbiased standard errors for the OLS coefficients.
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Based on the reviewed literature and theory, I hypothesize that in general central bank policy
rate differentials, sovereign bond spreads, expected GDP growth differential, large-scale asset
purchases, institutions, financial development, EU, and EZ membership will have a positive
effect on equity/debt portfolio inflows. On the other hand, I expect global investor risk aversion
(VIX) and financial openness to have a negative impact on equity/debt portfolio inflows to
emerging Europe. Additionally, I hypothesize domestic factors, specifically capital inflow
restrictions, institutional quality, financial development, and EU and EZ membership along with
expected GDP growth differentials to be more significant indicators for FM economies (see
Table 7 for a full summary of my predicted signs).

6

Results and discussion
This section is divided into five parts. The first section looks at the results for the entire

sample. In parts two and three, I decompose the sample into EMs and FMs and discuss results
across portfolio debt and equity inflows respectively. Part four uses interaction terms to quantify
significant differences in determinants of capital flows to the two emerging European subregions. Finally, in the last segment, I check the robustness of my model specification by
comparing the results from parts one to three to a two-quarter lagged model for only monetary
policy channel variables (central bank policy rate and sovereign debt differentials, and LSAP),
and a concurrent shock model.

6.1 Full Sample
Table 8 reports the estimation outcomes and robust standard errors in parentheses using the
five different model specifications (described in Section 5.2) for the entire sample of emerging
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European economies. Overall, the independent variables for portfolio bond inflows come in
statistically significant, have mostly the expected sign, and carry economically significant
magnitudes on the estimates. The results suggest that capital inflow restrictions, institutional
quality, and EU and EZ membership are all significant drivers of portfolio bond flows to
emerging Europe. Capital inflow restrictions, institutional quality, and EU membership are
significant across all three regressions that include domestic variables, while the coefficients for
EZ membership are all positive and statistically significant for specification four. Out of the four
significant variables, only capital restriction estimates are in the unexpected direction. An
increase in portfolio inflow restrictions by Turkey, Greece, and the Czech Republic coupled with
yield-seeking foreign investors continued to drive debt flows to these countries even with
deteriorating financial market liberalization. Supporting the results of Allegret and Sallenave
(2015) and Eller et al. (2014), I find EU and EZ membership both to be positive significant
drivers of debt flows. EU and EZ membership increase debt inflows as a percentage of GDP by
4.21% to 5.76%. Similarly, a one unit increase in institutional quality increases the debtdependent variable by 10.99% to 12.87%. The latter result is consistent with Fratzscher (2012),
Ahmed and Zlate (2014), Chen et al. (2014), and Byrne and Fiess (2015) all of which find the
variables to be positive and statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient was slightly
bigger but still in line with the papers mentioned leading me to believe that institutional quality is
of greater importance in an economic area with ultra-low interest rates such as the EZ compared
to emerging Asia and Latin America. This supports my hypothesis that an increase in the quality
of institutions along with EU and EZ membership allows economies within Europe to be a more
attractive investment and increase exposure to the global financial system in terms of larger
portfolio inflows.
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The results for the full sample portfolio equity inflows are mixed. The estimates for central
bank policy rate differentials are generally positive and statistically significant for the full model
with domestic variables and sovereign debt spreads (Regression 4). A one percentage point
increase in short-term interest rate differentials increased portfolio equity inflows as a percentage
of GDP by 0.032%, which translates to an additional $32,000 in investment for every $100
million in GDP. This might seem relatively insignificant, but to put this into perspective, with an
average GDP of $451 billion this increases equity inflows by an average of $14.43 million.
Nonetheless, the size of the estimate is roughly 50% smaller than Ahmed and Zlate (2014), but
in-between the results for Byrne and Fiess (2015) and Hannan (2017). Ahmed and Zlate (2014)
included AEs in their sample which makes their results less relevant to my findings. On the other
hand, Byrne and Fiess (2015) studied the pre-crisis period for a sample of EMs and found a
larger estimate, while the coefficient was smaller in the post-crisis results for Hannan (2017).
This discrepancy could be due to the smaller significance of central bank policy differentials as a
driver in the post-crisis period or structural differences in the sample countries. Future research
should divide the sample period into pre, during, and post-crisis periods to find the answer to this
question.
The other significant variables are capital inflow restrictions and EZ membership. Countries
with less liberalized financial markets saw a decrease of 1.29% to 2.07% in portfolio equity
inflows. Interestingly, even though Georgiadis (2015) used the Chin-Ito index and I implemented
Svirydzenka’s capital inflow restrictions index to measure the financial openness of a country the
magnitude of the results are in line with each other (they are both defined on a scale of 0 to 1).
EZ members saw a 0.37% to 1.38% increase in equity investment as a percentage of GDP. On
the other hand, the results suggest that being an EU member actually reduced equity investments
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by 1.51%. Most of the other portfolio equity inflow explanatory variables are insignificant but in
the right direction (expected GDP growth, LSAP, institutional quality, and current account).
The results for bond inflows show that contrary to equity investments central bank policy rate
differentials are in general statistically insignificant for bond inflows and although mostly having
a positive effect do also experience adverse effects for models one and three. Even though the
magnitude of the coefficient is within one thousand of a decimal to Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and
Georgiadis (2016), it opposes the overall significance of the variable in their findings. I offer
three explanations for this. First, Feldkircher (2015) found that while still significant due to
emerging Europe’s proximity, trade and financial integration with the EZ U.S. monetary policy
shocks have less of an impact on the region than ECB shocks. Additionally, the results of Chen
et al. (2014) show that U.S. monetary policy spillover effects on EM are only a recent
development, having been small or insignificant before the GFC. Given the eighteen-year
timeframe I use in this paper the results are likely to be impacted by the pre-GFC period. Lastly,
delving deeper into the data I find that results for central bank policy rate differentials are also
impacted by outliers from Turkey and Romania; removing these data points or Turkey from the
sample results in significant estimates. In 2001, Turkey went through a banking crisis after
building up foreign currency debts to the tune of 60% of GDP. After vulnerabilities started to
show the Turkish lira came under pressure, inflation skyrocketed to 68% in early 2001, and the
Turkish central bank defended the country’s crawling peg by increasing policy interest rates up
to 81% higher than rates in the U.S. (Brinke, 2013). From 2000 to 2002, even though policy rates
were extremely high debt and equity investors pulled large sums of money out of the country.
Romania went through a similar situation at roughly the same time. High policy interest rates

41

were accompanied by 40% inflation, 11% unemployment, and extensive portfolio capital
outflows from non-residents (Freedom House, 2018).
LSAP, the other monetary policy tool implemented to proxy U.S. unconventional monetary
policy, is insignificant across all regressions for portfolio bond and equity inflows, and mostly in
the unexpected direction with the exception of regressions three and four for the latter. Contrary
to current literature the LSAP coefficient for bond inflows is negative, and all the estimates for
both equity and bond inflows are extremely small. With the adoption of the Euro, Greece,
Slovenia, Estonia, and Lithuania handed over the ability to conduct monetary policy to the ECB.
Following the GFC, the ECB (and as a result all EZ countries) adopted ultra-low and even
negative interest rates which along with slow growth throughout all of Europe made EU and EZ
country debts unattractive to investors abroad. As a result, portfolio debt inflows to emerging
Europe and Europe as a whole retreated and remained subdued in the post-GFC period (see
Figure 2). All of this was going on at the same time as when the Fed implemented its LSAP
program, increasing the Fed’s balance sheet by nearly $4 billion. The coefficients for sovereign
debt spreads are statistically significant, but contrary to this paper’s hypothesis and past research
negative. Similar to the central bank policy rate differentials, this phenomenon can be explained
by outliers in the data from Turkey and Romania whose bond spread differentials to U.S.
Treasuries were particularly large from 2000 to 2002 yet still experience large bond and equity
outflows from non-residents due to domestic crises (see above).
Expected GDP growth differentials are insignificant for all five regressions, but the
coefficients are positive for both debt and equity inflows. These results are in line with Ahmed
and Zlate (2014), who found GDP growth differentials to overall positively impact net portfolio
flows; but the significance of the variable diminished in the post-crisis period. Structural changes
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in portfolio flows since the financial crisis can explain this, and future research on this topic
might want to expand on this paper by differentiating between the pre and post-crisis period. The
magnitude of the estimate on portfolio equity inflows is in line with aggregate net portfolio flow
results from Ahmed and Zlate (2014), but while still insignificant three times as high as portfolio
equity inflow results from Hannan (2017) suggest. Similarly, the magnitude on the bond
investment coefficient is four times higher than that found by Hannan (2017). I offer two
possible explanations for this, first Hannan (2017) studied a sample of AEs and EMs rather than
EMs and FMs, and second, I use expected not actual GDP growth differential numbers. Both can
help explain the discrepancy, but additional research is needed to provide statistical power.
Global risk aversion (as measured by the VIX) is insignificant for all five regressions
regardless of focusing on debt or equity inflows. The magnitude of the coefficient for bond
(equity) inflows is much larger (smaller) than results from Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and Hannan
(2017) suggest. Also, interestingly the estimated coefficients for debt and equity flows are in the
opposite direction for the specifications including domestic variables. While an increase in
global risk aversion decreases debt inflows, it increases equity inflows. One possible explanation
for this could be the change in the relationship between global risk aversion, and portfolio
inflows pointed out by Fratzscher (2012). While an increase in risk before the GFC was
associated with capital flows out of AEs and into EMs, this effect reversed during the GFC
inducing a substantial reallocation of capital from many EMs into a few AEs. My results suggest
that this change is more predominant for portfolio bond inflows.
Among the remaining insignificant domestic variables, the explanatory power of the current
account as a percentage of real GDP is marginal, while the coefficients for financial development
and CPI are in line with my hypothesis for debt investments.
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6.2 Emerging and Frontier Market Portfolio Debt Inflows
Table 9 presents the results for the drivers of EM and FM portfolio debt inflows. Central
bank policy rate differentials, financial openness, inflation, and EU membership are statistically
significant for emerging Europe’s EMs, while financial openness, financial development, and
inflation are drivers for FMs. Similar to the full sample, Eurozone membership and institutional
quality are the most consistent determinants for both groups. As institutional quality increased by
one unit, EM debt inflows went up by 11.66% to 19.42%. Similarly, EZ members in EM and FM
economies increased investments as a percent of GDP by 3.12% to 5.22% depending on
specification. Generally, the coefficients were larger for FMs which helps explain why half of
the FM sample countries are currently EZ members, most recently Lithuania adopted the euro in
2015. On top of EZ membership, being part of the EU was a significant driver for, increasing
inflows by 4.86% to 5.43% for EMs.
Monetary policy measures were largely insignificant with the exception of central bank
policy rate differentials for EMs. EMs could see an increase of 0.06% in debt investment for
every one percentage point increase in short-term interest rate differential. Domestic structural
variable were the main drivers of portfolio debt inflows for both EMs and FMs.
Interestingly, the results also highlight structural differences between the sub-groups. Capital
inflow restrictions and inflation were significant negative drivers of portfolio debt inflows for
FMs; but, contrary to past research, (e.g., Chen et al., 2014) had positive effects on EM bond
investments. The inflow restrictions effect was particularly large for FMs in the post-GFC period
(see Table 9 regression 4 results). An increase (decrease) in inflow restrictions (financial
openness), resulted in a 57.70% decrease in foreign debt investment. Current literature on the
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effect of inflation on portfolio flows is inconclusive. Sarno et al. (2016) found countries with
lower inflation to attract foreign investment, while a paper by Chen et al. (2014) indicated that
countries with high capital inflows experience inflationary pressures. My results suggest there
may be structural differences between EMs and FMs with regards to inflation because both of
the other papers utilize a diverse dataset of EMs and FMs rather than differentiate between the
two country types.
Financial development was insignificant for EMs but had a particularly large effect on debt
flows to FMs. In line with my hypothesis, a one unit increase in the variable increased portfolio
debt inflows by 17.49% to 23.13%. This finding leads back to a higher parity in financial
development between EMs than FMs (see Tables 4 and 5).
While not statistically significant, expected GDP growth differential had positive coefficients
for both EMs and FMs, but the estimates for EMs are much larger. I investigate this difference in
the section with interaction terms. Again, contrary to recent literature the variable LSAP is
insignificant and extremely small suggesting that due to the proximity to integration with the EZ
the U.S. LSAP did not significantly affect emerging Europe.

6.3 Emerging and Frontier Market Portfolio Equity Inflows
The story for portfolio equity inflows is somewhat mixed, as generally the independent
variables for EM portfolio equity inflows come in statistically significant, have the expected
sign, and carry economically significant magnitudes on the estimates, while the results for FMs
are largely insignificant. Table 10 shows the estimated model results and robust standard errors
in parentheses for all variables included.
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For EM portfolio equity flows central bank policy rate differentials were the most consistent
statistically significant variable along with expected GDP growth differentials, capital inflow
restrictions, and institutional quality. In contrast, LSAP, and EU and EZ membership were the
main determinants of portfolio equity inflows for FMs.
In line with Ahmed and Zlate (2012), Chen et al. (2014), Georgiadis (2016), and my
hypothesis, central bank policy rate differentials, capital flow restrictions/financial openness, and
institutional quality are significant drivers of investment for both equity and debt securities in
EMs. Additionally, supporting the findings of Hannan (2014), the estimate on central bank
policy rate differential for portfolio equity inflows is consistently more significant but smaller
than that for debt investments. A one percentage point increase in central bank policy rate
differentials increases portfolio equity flows to EMs by 0.02% to 0.05%.
While conventional monetary policy was a significant driver of EM equity flows, the
unconventional monetary policy proxy, LSAP, significantly drove foreign equity investment to
FMs. A $1 increase in the Fed’s balance sheet, increased portfolio equity inflows by 5.24e-07%
to 7.31e-07%. While the coefficient is almost negligible, LSAP was implemented in enormous
quantities, increasing the Fed’s balance sheet by nearly $4.0 billion over the sample period.
Nonetheless, the overall impact is relatively marginal and only translates to an additional $12
million in equity inflows per $100 million in LSAP. The magnitude of this finding is in line with
Anaya et al.’s (2017) results suggesting that LSAP only had a marginal impact on equity inflows
especially in emerging Europe, which was partially dragged down by weakness in developed
Europe. However, this still highlights the vast amounts of liquidity the Fed and ECB pumped
into financial markets, which along with negative real yields on most debt securities in the U.S.
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and Europe must have created a surge in portfolio equity flows to FMs all around the world
including in emerging Europe.
The coefficients for expected GDP growth differentials are comparatively large in magnitude
and positive for EMs, but small and in the unexpected direction for FM inflows. One reason for
this is data points surrounding the dot-com bubble and GFC. During those times, high growth
FM economies faced sizeable non-resident portfolio capital outflows caused by an investor riskoff move.
Similar to portfolio debt flows, global risk (as measured by the VIX) is insignificant across
all regressions for both EM and FM portfolio equity flows, but contrary to debt investment flows
the estimates are more consistently positive. This is inconsistent with previous literature and
common knowledge, but an explanation for this can be the way I calculate the global risk
variable. The VIX index is typically highly volatile and is determined on a daily basis, but this
paper averages the index’s values over an entire quarter leading to frequency discrepancies and
smoothening of overall volatility that can explain the insignificant positive coefficient.
EU and EZ membership are statistically significant and have a positive effect on FMs but are
in the unexpected direction for EMs. I am assuming that Greece has a significant impact on the
results for EM portfolio equity inflows as an EU and EZ member that has seen massive equity
outflows by non-residents since the European sovereign debt crisis. On the other hand, in
agreement with Eller et al. (2014) and Allegret and Sallenave (2015), my results suggest a
positive effect for FM economies in joining the euro monetary union and the associated financial
and trade integration with other member states.
The coefficients on inflation are once again in different directions for EMs and FMs,
increasing foreign equity investments for the former and decreasing inflows for the latter. This is

47

further evidence that EM and FM investors react differently to inflationary pressures and
strengthens my argument that future research should differentiate between the two country
classifications.

6.4 Emerging and Frontier Market Differences in Drivers
To further expand the understanding of the relationships among the variables across EMs and
FMs and to find significant differences in the magnitude of drivers of portfolio inflows for the
two subgroups I add various interaction terms. I introduce an EM dummy variable (1 if the
country is an EM, 0 if not) and interact it with all the variables from the full model. Table 11
highlights some of the key coefficients for the interaction terms. For portfolio debt inflows
financial development has a significant negative coefficient, meaning the variable has a stronger
relationship with portfolio debt inflows in FMs. For every 1 unit increase in financials
development, we expect to see 59.31% more portfolio debt inflows as a percentage of GDP to
FMs than EMs. Although not significant, this relationship also holds true for portfolio equity
inflows. For portfolio equity inflows, an increase in capital flow restrictions lead to 2.42% less
investments to EMs compared to FMs. On the other hand, institutional quality and EU
membership have significant positive estimates for portfolio debt and equity inflows. For every 1
unit increase in institutional quality, we will see 32.71% more portfolio debt inflows as a
percentage of GDP to EMs compared to FMs. Similarly, for EM EU member countries we
expect to see 7.07% and 1.43% more portfolio debt and equity inflows respectively. These
results are partially in line with my hypothesis. Domestic variables, capital inflow restrictions
and, financial development appear to be more significant indicators for FMs, but institutional
quality and EU membership are more significant positive estimates for EMs. Contrary to my

48

hypothesis, expected GDP growth differentials and EZ membership are not statistically
significant drivers for either EMs or FMs.

6.5 Sensitivity to alternative model specifications
I conduct an extensive series of sensitivity tests, focusing on different time lags by including
a concurrent model and a specification with two-quarter lags for slow-moving monetary policy
variables. I include both the full regression with and without sovereign interest rate spreads
because the number of observations is higher for the latter due to data limitation for FMs.

6.5.1 Full Sample
The results for portfolio equity and debt inflows are largely robust for both the concurrent
and lagged specifications. Interestingly, the magnitudes of most domestic variables increased for
the lagged model while the effect of external factors decreased. The coefficients for capital
inflow restrictions and institutional quality grew increased for the fully lagged model and grew
significant for debt and equity investments respectively. The estimate for institutional quality
changed from -0.33% to 0.82%, suggesting that the effect of institutional quality changes takes
time to manifest itself in portfolio equity flows. Similarly, with regards to debt investments, the
coefficient on institutional quality grew in significance from 8.11% to 10.99% for the lagged
model. On the other hand, the effect of central bank policy rate differentials became less positive
through the lag (estimate decreased from 0.15 to 0.07) especially for bond inflows suggesting
that central bank policy rate differentials have a larger impact on portfolio flows for emerging
Europe in the short term than over time. With the exception of capital inflow restrictions, all
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significant variables are robust to alternative lag specifications. Tables 12 and 13 show the full
sample estimates for both debt and equity inflows.

6.5.2 Emerging and Frontier Market Portfolio Debt Inflows
EM debt inflow sensitivity results behaved very similar to those from the full sample.
Domestic variables tended to increase in magnitude while external factors mostly decreased
when I introduced the lag. Capital inflow restrictions are again only statistically significant for
the fully lagged model and institutional quality increase in importance. Other than the full
sample, the estimate on EU membership increase and central bank policy differentials actually
loses significance with the lag, further strengthening my findings that central bank policy rate
differentials have a larger impact on portfolio debt flows in the short term.
The results for FM economies summarized in Table 15 are much more interesting. While
most external variables still decrease in importance, sovereign interest rate spreads and LSAP
had a larger positive impact on portfolio debt flows. Additionally, the signs for LSAP, capital
inflow restrictions, and institutional quality actually flip and in the case of capital inflow
restrictions grow significant by introducing lags into the model. I believe this is largely due to
differences in short-term and long-term effects of these variables. While capital inflow
restrictions can prevent foreign investors from withdrawing their money in the short-term it will
ultimately lead to less investments flowing into a specific country. Similarly, strong institutions
will make a country a more attractive target for investment but implementing a change to
strengthen a country’s institutions can lead to short-time hiccups. For both EMs and FMs, the
estimates for EU membership increased in magnitude, providing evidence that emerging
European countries will benefit from joining the European single market.
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6.5.3 Emerging and Frontier Market Portfolio Equity Inflows
The results for FM portfolio equity flows are even less significant for the concurrent
model; no variable is statistically significant for the concurrent model. By introducing a twoquarter lag, the coefficients for EU and EZ membership become statistically significant and
increase from 0.02% to 0.53% and 0.11% to 0.37% respectively. Additionally, LSAP grows
more positive and significant when introducing a lag. Nonetheless, the results for FM portfolio
equity inflows are not robust to different time lags making it difficult to draw any conclusions.
In contrast, the main findings for EM equity investments are robust and increase in
magnitude and statistical significance by introducing lags. The estimates on central bank policy
rate differentials increase from 0.03% to 0.05% and 0.04% to 0.05%, while the expected growth
differential decreases in magnitude but grows in significance with the lag. Similar to central bank
policy rate differentials, estimates for capital inflow restrictions are consistently significant and
grow more negative with lags. Global risk aversion, LSAP, and the current account balance
normalized for GDP remain insignificant for all specifications. Tables 16 and 17 show the
coefficients and standard errors for each variable.
In summary, results for EM bond and equity inflows remained largely robust for different
time lags, while the results were mixed for FM inflows. For bond inflows, estimates for domestic
EM and FM variables generally increased in magnitude and significance while external factors
grew less important by introducing lags. Nonetheless, for the concurrent and lagged model
domestic variables, specifically institutional quality, capital inflow restrictions, and EU and EZ
membership, were the main drivers of portfolio debt inflows to both EMs and FMs. The findings
for EM equity inflows are also mostly robust to different time lags. Coefficients for central bank
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policy rate differentials and capital inflow restrictions are significant and in the right direction for
all specifications, while institutional quality is a positive driver but only significant for the fully
lagged model. FM portfolio equity inflow results are mixed. They are generally neither robust
nor statistically significant with the exception of EU and EZ membership.

7

Policy Implications
The findings of this paper have important policy implications for emerging European

policymakers. Challenges for these countries usually arise when large amounts of capital flow in
or out of the country (Forbes and Warnock, 2012). Since the GFC, ultra-low interest rates in the
West have pushed investors to “reach for yield” elsewhere and diversify into higher risk EM and
FM securities. At the same time, an increase in globalization and the ensuing interconnectedness
of financial markets has made it significantly easier for people to invest abroad (Georgiadis,
2016). Given the global financial market integration and mobility of capital, portfolio flows to
EMs post-GFC have increasingly been influenced by changes in U.S. monetary policy (Chen et
al., 2014). The magnitude of the spillover effect depends on both external and domestic factors.
However, while some determinants of portfolio capital flows to emerging Europe such as global
risk, GDP growth differentials, and contagion cannot be controlled by policymakers, country
characteristics usually can. This suggests that EM governments should focus on the variables
they can control such as capital flow restrictions, financial development, the quality of
institutions, and industry structure and continue to strengthen them (Georgiadis, 2016). The
results support my findings for EM and FM portfolio debt and equity inflows. Specifically, less
capital inflow restrictions, increased financial development, and better institutions lead to larger
portfolio inflows, while international vulnerability, in the form of the current account balance,
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decreases inflows. Additionally, trade integration with the EU and EZ positively affects portfolio
debt inflows for emerging Europe and portfolio equity inflows for FMs. Domestic factors are
crucial for capital flows and can typically be influenced by domestic policymakers, but my
results suggest that there is also still a need for governments to keep an eye on the GDP growth
rate differentials to the U.S. as it is a significant driver of portfolio flows to emerging Europe.
While financial market integration continues to expand, it will be important to monitor if
EMs are at times at the mercy of the U.S. monetary policy. Findings that U.S. monetary policy
has a significant impact on EM capital flows (Chen et al., 2014; Georgiadis, 2016; Koepke,
2018) support the argument that financial globalization has undermined the effectiveness of
monetary policy in non-US economies. My results suggest that at least for emerging Europe this
is not the case as central bank policy rate and sovereign debt spread differentials are significant
drivers of portfolio inflows, but central banks in emerging Europe should still be aware of
movements in the Fed monetary policy path. Increased forward guidance, a policy tool that has
been effectively used by the Fed since the GFC, can additionally help central banks around the
world plan and regulate policy interest rate differentials.
Globalization has increased the dependence of EM and FM economies on developed markets
in North America and Europe. The industry structures in these countries typically heavily lean
toward manufacturing, which is mainly reliant on growth and consumption elsewhere, mostly
developed markets. With most of the global growth over the next decade projected to come from
EMs and FMs, understanding the drivers of capital flows to these high growth regions is integral
not only for domestic policymakers but also central bankers in AEs, specifically from the Fed
and ECB. While the Fed’s and ECB’s mandate is to deliver domestic price stability and
sustainable growth, changes in U.S. monetary policy can have significant consequences for EMs
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and FMs including currency appreciation (depreciation), downward (upward) pressure on
inflation, and market volatility that can have residual second degree effects on the U.S. economy
(Chen et al., 2014). This shows the importance, and positive effects cooperation between EMs
and the U.S. and EZ along with the role of global institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and
World Trade Organization can have. This is most definitely applicable right now as the Fed has
tightened monetary policy and is partially unwinding its balance sheet. Internal coordination
between the Fed and EM central banks can help dampen current surges and stops in capital
flows.

8

Conclusion
Unlike previous research on this topic, my study examines the spillover effects of U.S.

monetary policy and determinants of portfolio inflows to emerging Europe for both EMs and
FMs in the region. I expand current research on emerging Europe to include portfolio debt and
equity inflows and investigate the spillover effects of U.S. rather than ECB monetary policy,
given the USD’s role as the global reserve currency. I utilize various sources to compile a dataset
of five external and seven domestic variables identified by previous research for eleven countries
(five EMs and six FMs) in the region from 2000Q1 to 2018Q3.
My results confirm that U.S. monetary policy is a significant driver of portfolio inflows to
emerging Europe. I find that central bank policy rate differentials are particularly important for
portfolio equity inflows to emerging Europe (the full sample), and both equity and debt
investments to EMs. On the other hand, long-term sovereign bond spread differentials drive
portfolio debt inflows to FMs. My results further suggest that above all else having strong
institutions and developed financial markets along with financial openness and EZ membership
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in emerging Europe is crucial for monetary policy stability and absorbing monetary policy
spillover effects (Georgiadis, 2015). As financial markets become ever more intertwined,
effective communication on forward monetary policy guidance from the Fed will continue to be
tremendously helpful for central bankers in developing economies. Guidance is also in the selfinterest of the U.S. because U.S. based monetary policy shocks can lead to inflationary pressure
and currency and asset price volatility abroad which can have feedback effects on the domestic
economy. I also explore whether there are significant differences in drivers for EMs and FMs.
The results suggest that while capital inflow restrictions and financial development have a
stronger effect on debt and equity investments to FMs, the opposite is the case for institutional
quality and EZ membership.
Admittedly, there are four key limitations to my paper. The biggest drawback in my study is
the use of a lagged panel regression instead of a more sophisticated VAR or global VAR model.
As mentioned several times throughout this paper, a lagged panel regression cannot capture the
complex and dynamic transmission mechanisms between the various variables and global
financial markets that affect capital flows. Additionally, limited data availability for FM
sovereign debt yields significantly reduced the number of observations and timeframe for the FM
dataset. Similarly, my data collection process for the risk variable is a limitation. Because BoP
data is only available on a quarterly basis, I had to average the quarterly VIX data. The VIX is
highly volatile and averaging values over a three-month period diminishes the variables
explaining power. Lastly, again a data frequency issue data for capital inflow restrictions,
institutional quality, and financial development is only available on a yearly basis. As a result,
there is no quarterly variation in the variable which can skew some of the estimates and results.
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Based on my findings, future research on this topic should, similar to Chen et al. (2014),
divide the sample period into four monetary policy phases: 1) conventional U.S. monetary policy
leading up to the GFC, 2) unconventional U.S. monetary policy, 3) unconventional monetary
policy commencing with the tapering of QE, and 4) Quantitative tightening once the Fed started
to increase policy rates in December 2015. Investigating whether there are significant differences
between these different stages of U.S. monetary policy could be of great value for policymakers
in emerging Europe. Additionally, most academic research, including this one, treats EMs and
FMs as a homogeneous group when in fact they are rather heterogeneous in their level of
development and economic structures (Georgiadis, 2015). Differentiating between EMs and FMs
is a good start but drilling down to the country or small group level could be valuable to better
understand how the fundamental aspects affect the importance of various capital flows drivers.
Another promising avenue for future research is exploring the use of high-frequency portfolio
flows data, such as the monthly and daily data compiled by the Institute of International Finance.
The IIF data is broadly consistent with BoP principles and allows researchers to conduct event
studies around specific monetary policy announcements including the announcement of different
QE programs during the GFC (Koepke, 2015). Such data will allow for a more nuanced insight
and would particularly be useful for comparing drivers of portfolio flows systematically across
different data frequencies.
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Table 1: Determinants of Capital Flows (Hannan, 2017)
Push/Pull

GDP growth differential visà-vis U.S.
Interest rate differential vis-àvis U.S.

Push

Global risk aversion (log)
Commodity price growth
Global liquidity growth
U.S. Corporate Spread
U.S. Yield Gap

Pull
Trade Openness
FX reserves as share of GDP
Exchange rate regime
Institutional quality
Income per capita
Capital openness
Financial development

Table 2: Country Breakdown
Emerging (5)
Czech Republic
Greece
Hungary
Poland
Turkey

Frontier (6)
Croatia
Estonia
Lithuania
Kazakhstan
Romania
Slovenia

Figure 1: Emerging European Portfolio Equity Inflows (2000Q1 to 2018Q3)
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Figure 2: Emerging European Portfolio Debt Inflows (2000Q1 to 2018Q3)

Table 3: Summary Statistics, Full Sample

Domestic

External

Full Sample
Variables

N

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

Country code (#)
Year
Portfolio equity inflows (million $)
Portfolio bond inflows (million $)
Real GDP, seas. adj. (100 million $)
Norm. portfolio equity inflows
Norm. portfolio debt inflows
Policy rate differential (%)
Sovereign bond spread (bps)
Expected GDP growth differential (%)
VIX (log)
LSAP (millions $)
Capital inflow restrictions
Institutions
Financial development
Current account (millions $)
Norm. current account
Inflation (CPI)
European Union Dummy
Eurozone Dummy

825
825
825
825
825
825
825
825
550
750
825
825
650
748
748
825
825
825
825
825

6.00

3.16

138.54
590.81
450.78
0.20
1.33
4.64%
244.97
0.26%
2.91
2,266,395
0.28
0.50
0.39
-1,739.13
-3.18
94.15
0.60
0.20

747.18
3,080.15
514.79
1.80
6.17
7.90%
324.50
1.49%
0.35
1,545,076
0.22
0.51
0.11
3,603.29
6.91
23.63
0.49
0.40

1.00
2000Q1
-2,762.09
-33,009.50
13.95
-24.18
-51.22
-2.91%
-201.03
-11.99%
2.33
579,454
0.00
-0.98
0.12
-22,681.00
-21.49
18.48
0.00
0.00

11.00
2018Q3
8,644.83
17,321.72
2,439.08
16.99
35.42
75.60%
3,308.68
4.75%
4.07
4,497,297
1.00
1.27
0.69
6,655.82
34.63
208.88
1.00
1.00
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Table 4: Summary Statistics, Emerging Market Countries

Domestic

External

Emerging Markets
Variables

N

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

Country code (#)
Year
Portfolio equity inflows (million $)
Portfolio bond inflows (million $)
Real GDP, seas. adj. (100 million $)
Norm. portfolio equity inflows
Norm. portfolio debt inflows
Policy rate differential (%)
Sovereign bond spread (bps)
Expected GDP growth differential (%)
VIX (log)
LSAP (millions $)
Capital inflow restrictions
Institutions
Financial development
Current account (millions $)
Norm. current account
Inflation (CPI)
European Union Dummy
Eurozone Dummy

375
375
375
375
375
375
375
375
375
375
375
375
340
340
340
375
375
375
375
375

5.80

3.43

290.10
1,064.08
789.16
0.37
1.40
4.95%
264.98
0.21%
2.91
2,266,395
0.27
0.59
0.46
-3,296.39
-3.70
94.77
0.67
0.19

1,065.49
4,394.46
587.81
1.73
6.46
9.96%
352.39
1.44%
0.35
1,545,076
0.23
0.32
0.08
4,617.55
4.71
24.17
0.47
0.39

1.00
2000Q1
-2,762.09
-33,009.50
114.68
-7.82
-51.22
-2.91%
-201.03
-5.74%
2.33
579,454
0.00
-0.16
0.30
-22,681.00
-19.09
18.48
0.00
0.00

11.00
2018Q3
8,644.83
17,321.72
2,439.08
16.99
27.75
75.60%
3,308.68
4.75%
4.07
4,497,297
1.00
1.02
0.69
6,215.59
12.76
208.88
1.00
1.00

Table 5: Summary Statistics, Frontier Market Countries

Domestic

External

Frontier Markets
Variables

N

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

Country code (#)
Year
Portfolio equity inflows (million $)
Portfolio bond inflows (million $)
Real GDP, seas. adj. (100 million $)
Norm. portfolio equity inflows
Norm. portfolio debt inflows
Policy rate differential (%)
Sovereign bond spread (bps)
Expected GDP growth differential (%)
VIX (log)
LSAP (millions $)
Capital inflow restrictions
Institutions
Financial development
Current account (millions $)
Norm. current account
Inflation (CPI)
European Union Dummy
Eurozone Dummy

450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
175
450
450
450
408
408
408
450
450
450
450
450

6.17

2.91

12.25
196.41
168.80
0.06
1.26
4.37%
202.09
0.42%
2.91
2,266,395
0.27
0.43
0.33
-441.42
-2.75
93.63
0.55
0.21

209.11
991.19
152.39
1.85
5.91
5.64%
250.23
1.50%
0.35
1,545,076
0.19
0.62
0.10
1,534.32
8.29
23.18
0.50
0.41

2.00
2000Q1
-1,708.34
-4,551.51
13.96
-24.18
-22.74
-1.95%
-196.02
-11.99%
2.33
579,454
0.05
-0.98
0.12
-9,033.16
-21.49
27.98
0.00
0.00

10.00
2018Q3
3,020.88
7,648.47
662.59
12.64
35.42
32.87%
1,302.14
4.38%
4.07
4,497,297
0.80
1.27
0.58
6,655.82
34.63
179.02
1.00
1.00
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Table 6: Data Sources

Variables
Equity and Debt
portfolio inflow
variables; Current
Account balance
Real GDP, seasonally
adjusted; VIX;
European Union and
Eurozone dummies
Sovereign bond spreads

Frequency

Time Coverage

Sources

Quarterly

2000Q1 to 2018Q3

Financial Flow Analytics
Database compiled from
the IMF’s Balance of
Payments Statistics

Quarterly

2000Q1 to 2018Q3

Bloomberg

Quarterly

EMs
2000Q1 to 2018Q3
FMs
2011Q1 to 2018Q3

Bloomberg

Central bank policy
interest rates; CPI

Quarterly

2000Q1 to 2018Q3

Expected GDP growth

Quarterly

2000Q1 to 2018Q3

Federal Reserve bank
total assets

Quarterly

2000Q1 to 2018Q3

Annual

2000Q1 to 2016Q4

Institutions
(scale: -2.5 to 2.5)

Annual

2000Q1 to 2000Q4
and
2002Q1 to 2017Q4

Financial development
(scale: 0 to 1)

Annual

2000Q1 to 2016Q4

Capital Inflow
Restrictions
(scale: 0 to 1)

IMF database,
International Financial
Statistics (IFS)
IMF’s World Economic
Outlook (WEO)
Federal Reserve (FRED),
Bloomberg (prior to Q1
2003)
Fernandez, Klein,
Rebucci, Schindler, and
Uribe (2016), “Capital
Control Measures: A
New Dataset”, IMF
Economic Review 64
Average of World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance
Indicators
Svirydzenka, K. (2016),
“Introducing a New
Broad-based Index of
Financial Development”,
IMF Working Paper No.
16/5
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Table 7: Predicted Signs
Full Sample

Emerging Markets

Frontier Markets

Debt

Equity

Debt

Equity

Debt

Equity

Central Bank policy
rate differential
Expected GDP
growth differential

+

?

+

+

+

?

+

+

+

+

+

+

VIX (log)

-

?

-

-

-

?

LSAP

+

+

+

+

+

+

Sovereign interest
rate spread
Capital inflow
restrictions

+

?

+

?

+

?

-

-

-

-

-

-

Institutional Quality

+

+

+

+

+

+

Financial
Development

?

+

?

+

+

+

Current Account

?

?

?

?

?

?

CPI

?

?

?

?

?

?

European Union

+

+

-

-

+

+

Eurozone

+

+

-

-

+

+

Table 8: Result for Full Sample portfolio bond and equity flows
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Table 9: Results for EM and FM portfolio debt flows
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Table 10: Results for EM and FM portfolio equity flows

Table 11: Interaction Terms
Variables

Debt

Equity

Capital Inflow
Restrictions
Financial
Development

-----------------59.310***
(15.31)
32.710**
(12.13)
7.072***
(1.524)

-2.417*
(1.243)
-14.100
(9.974)
1.689
(1.276)
1.432***
(0.325)

546
0.306
YES
YES

546
0.180
YES
YES

Institutional Quality
European Union

Observations
R-squared
Country-Fixed Effects
Time-Fixed Effects

Robust standard errors in parantheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Full sample portfolio debt flow robust results

Table 13: Full sample portfolio equity flow robust results
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Table 14: EM portfolio debt flow robust results

Table 15: FM portfolio debt flow robust results
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Table 16: EM portfolio equity flow robust results

Table 17: FM portfolio equity flow robust results
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